Abstract-This paper shows that since votes of members of the Federal Open Market Committee have been included in press statements, stock prices increase after the announcement when votes are unanimous but fall when dissent (which typically is due to preference for higher interest rates) occurs. This pattern started prior to the 2007-2008 financial crisis. The differences in stock market reaction between unanimity and dissent remain, even controlling for the stance of monetary policy and consecutive dissent. Statement semantics also do not seem to explain the documented effect. We find no differences between unanimity and dissent with respect to impact on market risk and Treasury securities.
I. Introduction
E CONOMIC theory and empirical studies show that monetary policy has an important impact on the economy (Bernanke & Blinder, 1992) , with its most immediate effects seen on financial markets (Bernanke & Kuttner, 2005) . There is therefore great interest in how monetary policy decisions are taken by central banks, particularly whether their decision committees focus on consensus or whether these reflect heterogeneous policy views (Riboni & Ruge-Murcia, 2010) . 1 The decision process of central bank committees and the communication of monetary policy to the markets are still greatly debated in policy circles and academia, with no consensus or significant evidence on what constitutes an optimal strategy or the best practice (Blinder et al., 2008; Ehrmann, Eijffinger, & Fratzscher, 2012) . This paper studies how the communication of the vote of individual members of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) affects financial markets using intraday data. In particular, we distinguish between the impact of unanimous meetings versus those with dissent (one or more members in disagreement with the FOMC's decision, usually because dissenting members favor the setting of a higher interest rate). To do this we explore the fact that only from March 2002 onward has the vote of FOMC members been disclosed through the press statement, that is, at the same time as the committee's decision over the federal funds rate. Before this date, FOMC member votes were published only several weeks after the decision and days after the subsequent meeting.
We show that for the period before votes were included in press statements, there was no difference in the pattern of the S&P500 stock returns between the cases of FOMC unanimity and dissent, with both events being associated with statistically insignificant effects in a period of thirty or sixty minutes around the press announcement. After March 2002, markets lose value after dissent occurs but increase in value with unanimity. These conclusions are robust to the choice of econometric methodology, with similar findings in both ordinary least squares and median quantile regression (which is less sensitive to outliers).
We also show that the differences in returns between unanimity and dissent votes are still present even when controlling for surprise changes to monetary policy (Kuttner, 2001) , consecutive meetings with dissent, multiple votes of dissent, and reasons for dissent. Moreover, a positive impact of unanimity and a negative impact of dissent on returns exists for different time periods, including the 2002-2007 economic expansion prior to the financial crisis of [2007] [2008] . We went further and applied a structural break test with an unknown break date in the constant of an OLS regression with S&P returns. We encountered break dates that are consistent with the hypothesis that the cause for the differences in unanimity and dissent on stock markets documented for the period after March 2002 was the result of the change in communication policy in FOMC votes.
We also studied whether the opposing effects of unanimity and dissent on stock returns could be due to differences in the semantics of the statements. We found that dissent statements have on average a larger number of words than unanimity statements. However, this is the case because a larger fraction of dissent events occurred after the start of unconventional monetary policy (when statements became longer). Once one divides statements into subperiods before and after the start of unconventional monetary policy, then differences in semantics between unanimity and dissent cease to be statistically significant. This suggests that differences in the impact of financial markets between unanimity and dissent statements after March 2002 do not arise from semantics.
We then test how dissent and unanimity affect prices of futures of Treasury notes for several maturities, measures of market risk, and trading volume. Dissent and unanimity are both associated with an increase in trading volume and no impact on the remaining variables. We therefore do not find strong evidence to support that changes to market volatility and trading volume can explain the observed differences between unanimity and dissent.
We find that although less than 5% of the votes cast are against the FOMC's policy, decisions made with dissent are far from rare (which is also shown in Thornton and Wheelock, 2014 ) and represent about 40% of meetings. Furthermore, over one-third of the FOMC's members expressed dissent at least once over their terms. The finding that there is a different impact on financial markets when dissent votes are observed even though FOMC members overwhelmingly vote in favor can therefore be surprising. However, Blinder et al. (2001) note that "Fed traditions dictate that a member should 'dissent' only if they find the majority's (that is, the chairman's opinion) unacceptable." This makes a dissenting vote as something "noteworthy" (Blinder, 2007) and suggests that dissent votes understate the true degree of disagreement within the FOMC.
2 Meade (2005) does in fact show that disagreement voiced during meetings is much larger than that expressed in votes.
Previous studies found that FOMC announcements are associated with strong equity price appreciation (Tori, 2001; Lucca & Moench, 2015) , which are not fully accounted for by changes in monetary policy decisions. Cieslak, Morse, and Vissing-Jorgensen (forthcoming) also show evidence that the Fed affects stocks in between FOMC meetings. Our paper contributes to the literature by showing that statements of public unanimity and dissent have very different impacts on stock markets.
Our paper is also related to work on the communication policy of central banks. Policymakers and academics debate whether greater public disclosure is necessarily welfare increasing (Morris & Shin, 2002; Svensson, 2006) . Meade and Stasavage (2008) study how transparency in the monetary decision-making process can make members reluctant to dissent. Our paper shows that the reluctance of FOMC members to dissent could, in addition, be due to awareness of negative effects on financial markets.
Our results have important policy implications. The Federal Reserve and other central banks have become increasingly more transparent in recent decades (Blinder et al., 2008) . A recent example is the announcement of plans to publish European Central Bank minutes (Bryant, 2014) . The negative impact of public dissent on stock markets indicates that greater openness may not always be beneficial.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the FOMC's announcements policy, the results are shown in section III, and section IV concludes.
II. The Communication Policy of FOMC Votes
The FOMC oversees U.S. monetary policy and the open market operations (i.e., purchases and sales of U.S. Treasury securities) of the Federal Reserve System. The FOMC 2 Blinder (2007) considers that it is indeed "quite possible for the Fed to adopt one policy even though the (unweighted) majority favoured another" and describes a particularly revealing episode of this, in which the transcripts show that a clear majority preferred a different decision from the actual policy.
is composed of twelve members: the seven members of the Federal Reserve Board (who are nominated by the president), the New York Federal Reserve president, and four of the remaining eleven Federal Reserve bank presidents (who serve one-year terms on a rotating basis). Currently, the committee specifies policy in terms of a target level for the federal funds rate (the weighted average of interbank overnight loans).
3
Committee meetings are scheduled eight times per year at regular intervals (approximately once every six weeks). 4 Voting composition has been made public only through the minutes or press statements, which have only been published since 1993 and 1994, respectively. The minutes record the decisions of the FOMC over policy issues, including which committee members voted in favor of and against (dissent) the decision of the federal funds rate target level, plus the reasons that justify the dissent vote of each FOMC member. The minutes of FOMC meetings are released with a lag, with their release date until December 2004 being about six weeks after the committee's meeting (or approximately three days after the committee's subsequent meeting). Since 2005, minutes are released only three weeks after the meeting.
The first policy statement (announcement of a meeting's outcome) of the FOMC occurred in February 1994. Therefore, we consider the FOMC meetings from February 1994 to January 2018. Previously, the committee did not reveal policy decisions, and agents had to infer the federal funds target from the size and type of open market operations. Starting in February 1995, the FOMC has immediately communicated to the public all changes to monetary policy. From January 2000, the committee has issued a statement following each scheduled meeting (regardless of whether a change in policy was made). From 1994 until January 2002, statements did not include the voting composition of the FOMC's decision. From March 2002, the press statements also disclose the vote of each individual FOMC member and the reasons justifying the vote of each member who chose to dissent.
III. Empirical Results

A. Data
We used several data sources. From the Federal Reserve Board website, we obtained data on the decisions of the federal funds rate target level (FFR t ), voting composition of FOMC members, plus daily three-month Treasury bill yields (TY 3M,t ) and one-to five-year zero-coupon Treasury yields (see Gürkaynak, Sack, & Wright, 2007) . From the New York Fed, we obtained data on the overnight Treasury general collateral repo rate. From the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, we obtained daily data on the five-year forward inflation expectation rate (T 5YIFR t ) and five-year and ten-year Treasury Inflation Protected Securities (TIPS). From Bloomberg, we obtained daily frequency data on the VIX index (VIX t ) and the S&P trading volume (TV SP t ). From Quandl, we obtained federal funds future data to construct a measure of "surprise" rate changes (FFS t ) as in Kuttner (2001) . Finally, from Tick Data, we obtained intraday data on trading volume (total number of transactions) for the E-mini S&P futures (TV ES t ), Eurodollar futures (ED t ), the S&P stock market index price level (P t ), and futures price data of the two-year, fiveyear and ten-year Treasury notes (respectively, TN 2,t , TN 5,t , and TN 10,t ).
FOMC announcements have often occurred on days with other important information releases (Gürkaynak, Sack, & Swanson, 2005) . Therefore, our analysis focuses on intraday data. We calculate the intraday S&P returns as follows:
We consider both a "tight" and a "wide" intraday window as defined in the literature (Gürkaynak et al., 2005; Gorodnichenko & Weber, 2016) : the tight window is thirty minutes and starts ten minutes before the announcement, while the wide window is sixty minutes and starts fifteen minutes before the announcement. We report the times of each FOMC announcement since 1994 in table A1 in the online appendix. We study the impact on financial markets of FOMC meetings where there was unanimity versus one or more dissent votes in two different periods. The first period consists of the meetings between February 1994 and January 2002, when the voting composition became public only several weeks after the FOMC decision. The second period includes the meetings between March 2002 and January 2018, when the voting composition was disclosed in the FOMC press statement and therefore was known jointly with the federal funds rate target. Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for intraday frequency data of several variables for both the tight and wide windows of all FOMC announcements between 1994 and 2018. The variables included are S&P returns (r t ) and the change in the yield value for two-year, five-year, and tenyear Treasury notes futures (respectively TNY 2,t , TNY 5,t , and TNY 10,t ).
On average, S&P returns around FOMC meetings were positive for both unanimity and dissent meetings prior to March 2002. In this period, meetings with dissent had a higher average and median than unanimity (the median in this period for unanimity was actually negative in both windows). Meetings with dissent also had lower standard deviation than unanimity in this period. This is true for both the tight and wide windows, for which there is a substantial degree of correlation (in excess of 85%). After March 2002, the average and median of returns on meetings with unanimity were positive for both windows. The opposite happened with dissent (negative average and median for r t in this period for both windows). Meetings with dissent had higher standard deviation in this period.
Table 1 also shows that in the period prior to March 2002, there were greater increases (higher average and median) in the yields of Treasury notes of the two-year, five-year, and ten-year maturities with dissent than with unanimity. This is true for both the tight and wide windows. After March 2002, there were greater increases (higher average and median) in the yields of Treasury notes of the two-year, five-year, and ten-year maturities with unanimity than with dissent for the tight window. This is also true for the most part in the wide window (except that at the median, there was a larger increase in TNY 2,t and TNY 10,t with dissent than with unanimity). 
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p25, p50 and p75 denote, respectively, the 25, 50, and 75 percentiles.
For both windows and periods, regardless if there was unanimity or dissent, standard deviations increase for changes in the yield of Treasury notes with higher maturity.
In table A2 in the online appendix, we also include descriptive statistics for intraday frequency data of changes in trading volume for the E-mini S&P futures ( TV ES t ) and the change in the yield value for eurodollar futures ( EDY t ).
B. Summary of Facts on FOMC Voting
We start with a basic overview of the patterns in voting dissent. Table 2 shows that dissent represents only a small fraction of committee votes (less than 6% in both the period before and after votes were included in the FOMC statement). Most episodes are motivated by a desire for tighter monetary policy (i.e., preference for a higher interest rate), which occurred in 18 of the 22 meetings with dissent before March 2002 and on 47 of the 59 dissent meetings in the period afterward. Dissent for an easier policy (preference for a lower interest rate) is much less frequent, occurring only four times in the period before March 2002 and on 14 of the 59 meetings with dissent in the period afterward.
Many different FOMC members have expressed votes of dissent (more than 35% of FOMC members expressed votes of dissent in both the periods before and after March 2002). However, no committee member has always dissented. The median dissenter does so less than 15% of the time in either of the two periods. Table 2 also shows that frequent dissenters (defined as those on the 75 percentile) do so in less than onethird of their votes. Figure 1 shows the time series for the fraction of dissenting FOMC members per meeting. The figure shows that the pattern of dissent changed at about the time of the start of (Thornton & Wheelock, 2014) . Between February 1994 and October 2007, most dissent episodes included only one dissenter (there were only three dates with two dissenters and none with more than two dissenters).
5 Also in that period, most dissent episodes tended to be short (the two longest episodes occurred in 1996 and 2006 and lasted for three and four meetings, respectively). There is a considerable amount of literature on the determinants of FOMC dissent. Bank presidents typically dissent because of a preference for tighter monetary policy, whereas governor votes of dissent are typically for easier monetary policy (Belden, 1989; Thornton & Wheelock, 2014) . However, Tootell (1991) did not find statistically significant differences in the voting of bank presidents and governors. Thornton and Wheelock (2014) find that dissent in the FOMC is not easily predictable by macrovariables such as inflation and unemployment. However, Havrilesky and Gildea (1991) and Malmendier et al. (2017) found that some individual characteristics are helpful in predicting votes of dissent. Havrilesky and Gildea (1991) show that training background and career experience in private banking help explain why bank presidents tend to dissent for tighter monetary policy. Malmendier et al. (2017) find that FOMC members with personal experiences of inflation have significant predictive power for their voting decisions. 
C. The Effect of FOMC Voting on the S&P Index
We now analyze the data through an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression of S&P returns (r t ) around tight (30 minutes) and wide (60 minutes) windows of FOMC meetings:
where D t and U t are dummy variables for whether there was a vote of dissent on the date of the FOMC meeting or a vote of unanimity, respectively. The regression results with robust standard errors (which has become common practice in economics; see Angrist & Pischke, 2009 ) are shown in panel A of table 3. The coefficients of both the unanimity and dissent dummy variables are positive (with that for the dissent dummy quantitatively larger than that of unanimity) for the period between February 1994 and January 2002. For the tight window, neither unanimity nor dissent is associated with statistically significant coefficients in this period. For the wide window, the unanimity dummy is not statistically significant, while dissent is statistically significant at the 10% level. In the period with votes not included in the statement, for both the tight and wide windows, the coefficients of unanimity and dissent do not differ from each other at any conventional significance level.
For the period since March 2002, panel A of table 3 shows that the coefficient of the unanimity dummy is positive, while the coefficient of the dissent dummy is negative. For the tight window, both the unanimity and dissent coefficients are statistically significant at the 5% level, whereas for the wide window, unanimity is significant at the 1% level and dissent at the 10% level (which is also an adequate testing level given the relatively small number of meetings with dissent; for a detailed discussion of this argument, see Hendry, 1995) . 6 In 6 In table A3 in the online appendix, we examine the impact on stock markets from the FOMC minutes announcement in the period prior to March 2002. We found that neither unanimity nor dissent has a statistically significant impact on stock returns. We also show that unlike what typically happens with informative releases (see Ederington & Lee, 1993) , minutes announcements for FOMC meetings prior to March 2002 do not seem to this period, differences between unanimity and dissent coefficients are statistically significant at the 1% level for both tight and wide windows. We reach similar results if we exclude the observations for January 22, 2008, and October 8, 2008 , in which the announcements occurred outside trading hours.
In the period with public votes, investors experienced losses much more frequently when dissent was observed rather than unanimity (as shown in panel B of table 3). In the tight window around FOMC meetings, between 2002 and 2018, investors made losses in 62.7% of the meetings in which dissent occurred, while they made losses in only 38.9% in the meetings in which unanimity occurred. In the wide window around FOMC meetings, between 2002 and 2018, investors made losses in 57.6% of the meetings in which dissent occurred, while they made losses in only 29.92% in the meetings in which unanimity occurred. This did not occur prior to the release of vote information in the statement. Between 1994 and 2002, investors actually experienced fewer losses around FOMC meetings with dissent than with unanimity.
In figure A3 in the online appendix, we show that the differences between unanimity and dissent in the impact of S&P returns appear only after the announcement. We obtain similar significance levels to those reported in panel A of table 3 using conventional standard errors (see table A4 in the online appendix) and 5,000 replica bootstrap standard errors (see table A5 in the online appendix). We also obtain similar results if one uses median quantile (MQ) regression instead of OLS (see table A6 in the online appendix). The reason for also considering MQ is that it is more robust to outliers than OLS (for an extended treatment of the subject, see Koenker, 2005) . In table A7 in the online appendix, we show that the results are robust to excluding unscheduled meetings and monetary policy turning points. In table A8 in the online appendix, we show that differences between unanimity and dissent are not have an impact on intraday volatility. The likely reason for this is that prior to 2005, minutes were released with a delay of six weeks and only days after the subsequent scheduled FOMC meeting. This timing rendered "them largely of historical interest" as Rosa (2013) argued. Gürkaynak et al., 2005) . 7 Moreover, as shown in tables A9 and A10 in the online appendix, the results are robust to using one-day windows from 2:00 p.m. of the announcement day (because FOMC releases are consistently made at 2:00 p.m. or a few minutes afterward) to 2:00 p.m. of the day after the announcement. The conclusions are similar whether one uses daily returns (table A9) , excess returns calculated with the three-month Treasury bill yield (table A9), or excess returns calculated with the overnight Treasury general collateral repo rate (table A10) .
D. Potential Explanations
We now explore several possible causes for the differences in the effect on stock returns between FOMC meetings with dissent and unanimity since votes have been made public in the statement. 7 Prior to 1994, the FOMC did not issue statements; investors learned of federal funds target rate decisions through the implementation of open market operations of the New York Fed's trading desk. However, as Bernanke and Kuttner (2005) discussed, ahead of some meetings prior to 1994, the New York Fed's trading desk seems to have let the federal funds rate drift in the direction of a new target level. Investors interpreted this inaction as signaling a policy change. Following Gorodnichenko and Weber (2016) , in order to avoid almost all timing ambiguity in the main results of the paper, we use only meetings from 1994 onward (which we find particularly relevant due to the use of intraday data). We decided to have only results that included meetings starting in 1990 as a robustness check in the online appendix. In the first regression of table 4, we control for monetary policy using the federal funds surprise (FFS t ), which measures the unanticipated component of the change in the federal funds rate in the FOMC announcement (Kuttner, 2001 , shows that bond rates respond to unanticipated changes but not to anticipated changes). The results show that in both windows, dissent in the period since March 2002 has a negative coefficient that is statistically significant (at the 1% level for the tight window and at the 5% level for the wide window). The coefficient on the unanimity dummy in the period since March 2002 is statistically significant (at the 5% level for the tight window and the 1% level for the wide window) and positive for both windows. The differences between unanimity and dissent coefficients are statistically significant at the 1% level in both windows. Prior to 2002, FOMC meetings were associated with a small but not statistically significant positive postannouncement effect. The coefficient for Unscheduled t is positive but not statistically significant. The coefficient on the FFS t is not statistically significant, which differs from the findings of Bernanke and Kuttner (2005) and Gürkaynak et al. (2005) with a smaller sample of meetings. This is, however, consistent with the results of Gorodnichenko and Weber (2016) , who also did not obtain a statistically significant coefficient for the federal funds surprise on a 30 minute window around FOMC statement releases from 1994 to 2009.
In the second regression of table 4, we control for monetary policy using two monetary policy factors (MF 1,t and MF 2,t ), which Gürkaynak et al. (2005) showed adequately capture the effects of U.S. monetary policy on asset prices. This regression does not include the last FOMC announcement with Yellen as chair (which happened on January 31, 2018) because we only have data available for the factors until the end of 2017. The results are very similar to those obtained with the first regression. The coefficient on the dissent dummy in the period since March 2002 is statistically significant (at the 5% level for the tight window and the 10% level for the wide window) and negative for both windows. The coefficient on the unanimity dummy in the period since March 2002 is statistically significant (at the 5% level for the tight window and the 1% level for the wide window) and positive for both windows. The differences between unanimity and dissent coefficients are again statistically significant at the 1% level in both windows. Prior to 2002, FOMC meetings were associated with a small, positive coefficient (which is statistically significant at the 10% level in the tight window but not in the wide window). Unlike with the first regression, the coefficient for Unscheduled t is negative (but, as previously, not statistically significant). Consistent with the results in Gürkaynak et al. (2005) , both monetary policy factors have a negative effect on S&P returns, and only one factor has a statistically significant coefficient.
In the third regression of table 4, we control for monetary policy by having several dummy variables: Recession t is an NBER recession dummy indicator, Tightening t is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the observation occurs in a period of monetary tightening, and Easing t is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the observation occurs in a period of monetary easing. 8 The results are similar to the previous regres-sions. Dissent has a negative effect on S&P returns while unanimity has a positive effect (both are statistically significant at the 5% level for the tight window and the 10% and 1% levels for the wide window for dissent and unanimity, respectively). The differences between unanimity and dissent coefficients are again highly statistically significant in both windows. Again, prior to 2002, FOMC meetings were associated with a small, positive coefficient (which is statistically significant at the 10% level in the tight window but not in the wide window). None of the coefficients for the Unscheduled t , Recession t , Tightening t , and Easing t dummies are statistically significant. The result of a negative effect of dissent in the period with public voting is robust to using multiple controls for monetary policy in daily data with 2:00 p.m. returns (see table  A11 in the online appendix) for both OLS and MQ regressions. In table A12 in the online appendix, we do another exercise that again indicates there is not much support for the hypothesis that the stance of monetary policy accounts for the differences between unanimity and dissent in the period with votes in the statement. We reestimate equation (2) but using as dependent variable changes in the three-month Treasury bill yield (TY 3M,t ) around a one-day window (closing hour of the previous day to the closing hour of the announcement day) instead of S&P returns. The OLS estimates with robust standard errors show that both dissent and unanimity meetings are associated with quantitatively small effects (1 basis point or less) and do not statistically differ from 0.
The financial crisis of 2007-2008. One might conjecture that the differences found in the impact on stock returns of unanimity and dissent between the periods before and after March 2002 could be the result of something other than the change in communication policy of the FOMC (the inclusion of votes in the statement from March 2002 onward). In particular, it can be tempting to think that the negative coefficient associated with dissent may simply be the result of a prolonged period of bad news (say, the financial crisis of [2007] [2008] . In our view, this is not a good explanation for the phenomenon we report, since we compare stock price returns in a window around the FOMC announcements, and events such as the financial crisis are already known in the previous days.
To dismiss the possibility of our findings being the result of the financial crisis of 2007-2008, we look at the effects of dissent and unanimity on returns over the subperiods before and after February 2007 (the starting date of the time line of the financial crisis in the St. Louis Fed website) for the time in which the vote has been made public. The results of reestimating equation (2) using OLS with robust standard errors for the two subperiods are shown in table 5.
The estimates of table 5 show that the negative impact of dissent on stock markets is already present in the subperiod prior to February 2007. In this subperiod, the coefficient for dissent is negative and statistically significant at the 1% level for both windows. The coefficient on the unanimity dummy in this period is positive in both windows but statistically significant (at the 10% level) only for the wide window. In this period, the differences between unanimity and dissent coefficients are statistically significant at the 5% level for the tight window and the 1% level for the wide window. Table 5 also shows that in the period prior to the financial crisis, 85.7% of announcements with dissent were associated with negative returns for both windows (whereas for unanimity, only 42.4% and 30.3% of announcements were associated with negative returns in the tight and wide windows respectively). Table 5 also shows that dissent had a negative effect on stock returns and unanimity a positive effect for the period after February 2007. In this subperiod, the differences between unanimity and dissent coefficients are statistically significant at the 1% level for both windows. We obtain similar significance levels to table 5 using conventional standard errors and 5,000 replica bootstrap standard errors (see tables A13 and A14 in the online appendix, respectively).
We now do another exercise to provide further support that the observed differences between the period before and after March 2002 in the impact of FOMC unanimity and dissent meetings were the result of changes in the communication of FOMC votes. The exercise consists of testing for a structural break with an unknown break date in the constant of an OLS regression with S&P returns around intraday windows of FOMC meetings with dissent (r D t ) as the dependent variable. We applied a wild bootstrap supWald test (Boldea et al., forthcoming) to test for the null of no break in the OLS constant against the alternative of a break in the constant. 9 The OLS regression, shown below, includes dummy variables to control for monetary policy (these were the regressors which 9 The trimming parameter of the supWald test is 0.25, a typical value in the literature. The number of bootstrap replications is 200. We applied two versions of the wild bootstrap: the fixed regressor wild bootstrap that uses the conditional OLS mean and the residuals to generate the bootstrap samples, and the fixed regressor wild bootstrap that uses only the OLS residuals (as in Hansen, 2000) 
For both windows, the date break identified was September 24, 2002, the first FOMC announcement with a vote of dissent in the statement. The break is statistically significant at the 5% level for the tight window and at the 10% level for the wide window using the fixed regressor wild bootstrap. We also estimated equation (4) but using S&P returns around intraday windows of FOMC meetings with unanimity (r U t ) as the dependent variable instead of r D t . For the tight window, the date break identified was January 3, 2001 (statistically significant at the 1% level using the fixed regressor wild bootstrap), and for the wide window, the date break identified was May 4, 2004 (statistically significant at the 5% level using the fixed regressor wild bootstrap). The first FOMC announcement with a vote of unanimity was on March 18, 2002, which is between these two break dates identified. One likely reason why it is harder for the test to detect the exact break date of the policy change is that in the case of unanimity there is no sharp contrast in the effect on stock returns between the two periods. Dissent is associated with average positive returns prior to the policy change and negative afterward (see table 3 ). However, unanimity is associated with average positive returns before and after the change in communication of votes in the statement (the impact of the policy was only an increase in the average, as shown in table 3).
The structural break test results are robust to the choice of methodology. We obtain identical break dates and significance levels if we instead adopt the Hansen (2000) wild bootstrap.
Other variables related to FOMC voting. We now examine whether the finding of a negative effect of dissent and a positive effect of unanimity continues to be present after accounting for multiple dissent, consecutive dissent, and reasons for dissent. To do this, we reestimate equation (3) with a vector of additional controls (X t ) that includes not just the federal funds surprise (FFS t ) to account for monetary policy as in the baseline regression but also the following variables: CD pub 2,t , which is a dummy (period after March 2002) for whether dissent happened in the current meeting and the previous meeting or more (that is, two or more consecutive dissent meetings in a row); PD pub t , which is the mean (period after March 2002) for FOMC members who voted dissent in a meeting of their fraction of past dissent votes (for unanimity meetings, the variable therefore takes the value of 0); MD pub t , which is a dummy for two or more dissenting votes (period after March 2002); and DE pub t , which is a dummy (period after March 2002) of dissent for easier policy.
The estimates for OLS regressions with robust standard errors are shown in table 6. We again find a negative coefficient for dissent and a positive coefficient for unanimity in the period with votes in the statement for both windows. The differences between unanimity and dissent are again highly statistically significant in both windows (at the 1% level for the tight window and at the 5% level for the wide window). None of the coefficients on the dummies for consecutive dissent (CD pub 2,t ), multiple dissent (MD pub t ), and dissent for easier (DE pub t ) are statistically significant. The coefficient for PD pub t is found to be positive and statistically significant at the 1% level. This indicates that markets find fewer reasons for concern when present dissent is from members who dissented often in the past.
The result of a negative effect of dissent in the period with public voting is robust to using controls for multiple dissent, consecutive dissent, and reasons for dissent in daily data with 2:00 p.m. returns (see tables A15 and A16 in the online appendix) for both OLS and MQ regressions. However, the coefficient for PD pub t is no longer statistically significant when using daily data (table A15) . Therefore, there is no strong support for the hypothesis that markets view differently the votes of members who dissent frequently. This is also the case if we instead use a dummy for whether the dissent vote was made by Ms. George or Mr. Lacker (the only members who disagreed on more than 50% of their meetings in our sample). Table A16 in the online appendix shows that measuring serial dissenting in that manner also results in nonstatistically significant results.
Semantic analysis of FOMC statements. We now do a semantic analysis of FOMC dissent and unanimity statements in the period with voting included in the statement (March 2002 onward) . In doing this, we make use of the data produced by Meade and Acosta (2015) in their study of the semantics of FOMC statements. Table 7A shows the average number of words for unanimity and dissent statements for the period from March 2002 to December 2014 (this is the last statement included in the work of Meade and Acosta, 2015) . 10 The table shows that between March 2002 and December 2014, dissent statements on average were substantially longer than unanimity statements (average of about 409 words for dissent statements and 249 for unanimity statements) and that the difference in length is statistically significant. However, researchers (Hernandez-Murillo & Shell, 2014; Meade & Acosta, 2015) have identified that FOMC statements became substantially longer from January 2009 onward (the beginning of so-called unconventional monetary policy). It is therefore possible that the average difference in number of words between dissent and unanimity statements can simply be accounted by the high frequency of dissent after 2009, whereas the period between 2000 and the onset of the financial crisis saw an unusual degree of consensus (Wynne, 2013) . Our analysis seems to confirm such a hypothesis. Prior to January 2009, the average number of words in a dissent statement was 174, and unanimity statements had an average of about 163. From January 2009 onward, the average number of words of dissent statement was 508 and that of unanimity statement was 484. In both subperiods (2002-2008 and 2009-2014) there are no statistically significant differences in number of words between unanimity and dissent statements. Table 7B shows the semantic similarity of raw consecutive FOMC statements. "Raw" means that no preprocessing of the text was done for this measure of semantic similarity by Meade and Acosta (2015) . The results show that for both dissent and unanimity statements, the degree of similarity with the previous statement is very high. The differences in similarity with the previous statement between dissent and unanimity are statistically significant at the 5% level for the sample from 2002 to 2014. However, dissent statements became more frequent from 2009 onward, which corresponds to a period of a very high level of similarity in statements (Meade & Acosta, 2015) . Differences in similarity with the previous statement between dissent and unanimity are no longer statistically significant once one splits the data in two subperiods (before and after January 2009).
It is not unusual to observe periods of several consecutive unanimity statements or several consecutive dissent statements. Therefore, it may be possible that the numbers in panel B of table 7 simply indicate that dissent statements are similar to previous dissent statements but could nonetheless be very different from previous unanimity statements. For this reason, in panel C of table 1, we consider only observations of dissent statements preceded by unanimity statements. The numbers show that the similarity between a statement of dissent and a preceding unanimity statement is not any different (at any conventional significance level) from the similarity between consecutive unanimity statements that precede votes of dissent. This is true not just for the subperiods before and after January 2009 but also for the entire period with voting included in the statement.
In summary, we show that there are no statistically significant differences between dissent and unanimity statements in number of words and semantic similarity to the previous statement once one takes into account the overall increase in number of words and semantic similarity in FOMC statements after the start of unconventional monetary policy. We also show that the similarity between a dissent statement and a preceding unanimity statement is just as high as that between consecutive unanimity statements prior to a statement of dissent. Our analysis indicates that differences in the impact of financial markets between unanimity and dissent statements after March 2002 do not arise from semantics. In the online appendix, we show that this assessment is robust to using a measure of semantic similarity after standard preprocessing steps of text (table A17). The findings are also robust to using both standard preprocessing steps of text and giving lower weight to terms that occur in many statements (table A18 in the online appendix) because such words do not help to distinguish semantic content between documents.
Market volatility, trading volume, and Treasury notes. To search further for a potential mechanism for the different impact of dissent versus unanimity, we now look at their effect on other variables since March 2002. Table 8 shows the results of reestimating equation (2) for windows of 30 minutes and 60 minutes around FOMC announcements using as dependent variables: prices of futures of the two-year, fiveyear, and ten-year Treasury notes (TN 2,t , TN 5,t , and TN 10,t ); squared returns and absolute returns (r 2 t and |r t |); and the trading volume for the E-mini S&P futures (TV ES t ). Note that the risk and trading volume variables are always positive; therefore, it does not make sense to test whether both unanimity and dissent are different from 0. Therefore, the regressions for those dependent variables use a constant instead of a unanimity dummy. A regression with a constant (same as the coefficient for unanimity) and dissent dummy gives a clear test of whether dissent differs from unanimity.
We first explore whether there is a connection between dissent or unanimity and expectations of the path of future monetary policy. Unanimity and dissent have no statistically significant impact on the two-, five-, and ten-year Treasury notes' futures (TN 2,t , TN 5,t , TN 10,t ) on both windows. In the table A19 in the online appendix, we show the same occurs for these variables in a one-day window after the announcements. In the one-day window, we also show that unanimity and dissent have no impact on the five-year-forward inflation expectation rate. In the online appendix, we also show that unanimity and dissent do not affect the prices of Eurodollar futures (see table A20) or the Treasury yields (using close price daily data) for one-year, eighteen-month, threeyear, and five-year maturities (see table A21) in the days of FOMC announcements (and in the day after). So the differences in the impact on stock returns of unanimity and dissent in the period since March 2002 do not seem to be explained by expectations of the path of future monetary policy.
11
The results in table 8 also show that changes to market risk are not a likely explanation for the negative effect of dissent on stock prices. Asset pricing theory predicts that investors require higher returns for exposure to market risk; therefore, higher market volatility should have a negative impact on returns (as shown in Campbell & Hentschel, 1992) . However, we do not find an effect of dissent statements for either squared returns or absolute returns on windows of 30 and 60 minutes. In the online appendix (table A19) , we show the same occurs for these variables in a one-day window after the announcements. In table A20 in the online appendix, we show that dissent also does not have an impact on the demeaned squared returns and the absolute value of the deviation of returns from the median (since dissent and unanimity have an impact on the mean and median returns, these definitions measure the variance or absolute deviation of the returns conditional on the vote outcome).
It is known that informative announcements have a strong effect on intraday volatility (for a brief summary of this research, see Hautch & Hess, 2007) , which persists substantially higher than normal for fifteen minutes after the announcement (Ederington & Lee, 1993) . This too is the case of FOMC statements as shown in figure 3 of Lucca and Moench (2015) . The empirical exercises in table 8 test whether volatility at the end of the window differs from that at the beginning of the window. Even the tight intraday window considered (thirty minutes, starting ten minutes before 11 The finding that dissent and unanimity do not reveal much information regarding the future path of monetary policy may seem in contradiction with the results in Gerlach-Kristen (2004) for the Bank of England's monetary policy committee (MPC). However Blinder (2007) shows that the U.S. central bank typology is more "autocratical," while the United Kingdom's is more of an "individualistic MPC." Since dissent votes have a different importance in the United States and the United Kingdom, there is reason to doubt that dissent in these central banks should be associated with a similar impact on expected future monetary policy. Also, dissent is a much larger fraction of votes in the United Kingdom than in the FOMC (see Horvath et al., 2014) . This implies that the FOMC's chair has fewer incentives to adjust policy to satisfy the views of dissenting members. the announcement and ending twenty minutes after) would therefore be unlikely to capture this rapid increase and fall in volatility. For this reason, we also examined whether there are differences between unanimity and dissent with respect to the observed peak for intraday volatility inside a window of thirty minutes around FOMC statement releases. We measure the peak as the maximum value observed inside the tight intraday window (30 minutes around the announcement). We measure the increase in intraday volatility due to the FOMC statement as the maximum intraday volatility value minus the intraday volatility value at the start of the window (10 minutes prior to the announcement). The results are shown in table 9. We find that both unanimity and dissent increase intraday volatility inside a 30 minute window (the difference between volatility at the peak and at the start of the window is statistically significant at the 1% level for both). However, there are no statistically significant differences between unanimity and dissent measured at the peak or in the increase of intraday volatility inside a 30 minute window around FOMC announcement.
Finally, we look at the impact of FOMC unanimity and dissent announcements on trading volume (TV ES t ). Because there is no intraday data for the S&P index trading volume, we instead use data for the E-mini S&P futures, as in Lucca and Moench (2015) . In table 8, we confirm that dissent increases trading volume for the E-mini S&P futures for both the tight and wide windows (the same occurs in a one-day window after the announcement, as shown in table A19 in the online appendix). Amihud (2002) documents a negative relationship between contemporaneous unexpected illiquidity and excess returns on U.S. equities, so the higher trading volume associated with dissent should have a positive effect on returns. Therefore, differences in liquidity do not seem to account for why dissent is associated with a negative effect on stock markets.
IV. Conclusion
We find that the pattern of excess stock returns around FOMC announcements changed when the vote of individual members became publicly available at the same time as the decision over the federal funds target rate. In this period (from March 2002 onward), stock prices on average increased when the vote was unanimous, with markets losing value when dissent (usually because of preference for tighter monetary policy) occurred, whereas previously, both dissent and unanimity were associated with average positive returns.
The negative effect of dissent in the period with votes in the statement persists even if one controls for monetary policy or for consecutive and multiple dissent episodes. We also find that the differences between unanimity and dissent are already present prior to the financial crisis of 2007-2008 (and structural break tests with unknown date support the hypothesis that the changes occurred at the time of the change in communication policy of FOMC votes). Moreover, a semantic analysis of FOMC statements does not seem to account for the differences in effect on stock returns between unanimity and dissent observed since March 2002.
We explore other hypotheses for the results such as differences between unanimity and dissent announcement in market volatility, liquidity, and expectations of future monetary policy but do not find strong evidence for any of them. Thus, as of this paper's writing, a clear mechanism that explains the findings remains elusive.
